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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PREACCUSATION DELAY AS VIOLATION OF
DUE PROCESS: ABSENCE OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS Is FACTOR
To BE WEIGHED AGAINST MURDER DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATIONS OF
ACTUAL PREJUDICE-State v. Haga, 8 Wn. App. 481, 507 P.2d 159
(1973), review denied, 82 Wn. 2d 1006 (1973).
On July 6, 1966, the wife and an infant daughter of Eric L. Haga
were found strangled to death in the Haga home. Although Haga had
slept in the house the night of the murders, no evidence linked him
directly to the crime. There was, however, evidence that Haga and his
wife had separated the previous summer, that Mrs. Haga had lived
with another man during the separation, and that Haga had taken out
a family life insurance policy shortly before the murders. The prose-
cuting attorney chose not to prosecute Haga; more than five years la-
ter, however, a newly elected prosecutor reopened the case and filed
two counts of first degree 'murder. A jury convicted Haga on both
counts.
Haga appealed, arguing that the five year delay between the com-
mission of the crimes and the filing of the murder charges had denied
him due process of law under the federal and state constitutions. The
state freely admitted that no new evidence had surfaced in the inter-
vening five years, and that the only reason for the filing of charges in
1971 was the change of prosecutors.' It was acknowledged that the
delay had caused defense witnesses to become unavailable, 2 and that
the delay was long enough "to cause concern about the dimming of
memories and lost evidence."3 The Washington Court of Appeals de-
fined what it concluded to be the applicable due process test and held
that the five year delay in filing charges did not deny the defendant due
process because an evaluation of the entire proceedings failed to reveal
a showing of "actual prejudice" to the defendant sufficient to overcome
the legislative intent expressed by the absence of a statute of limitations
for the crime of murder.4
1. State v. Haga, 8 Wn. App. 481, 486, 507 P.2d 159, 163 (1973), review denied,
82 Wn. 2d 1006 (1973).
2. Id. at 487, 507 P.2d at 164.
3. Id. at 488, 507 P.2d at 164.
4. Aside from the due process holding, the Haga court found other grounds for
reversal-impermissible admission of opinion testimony from a lay-person (the ambul-
ance driver) which gave rise to an inference regarding the guilt or innocence of the
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This note will evaluate application of the Haga court's due process
test, especially in light of United States v. Marion,5 a recent Supreme
Court decision focusing on the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.
It is suggested that the Haga court set forth an appropriate due process
test, but misapplied its own test by incorrectly assuming that absence
of a statute of limitations for murder serves in some way to justify an
otherwise inexcusable delay in commencing prosecution.
I. MARION: LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL
In United States v. Marion,6 the Supreme Court held that the sixth
amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial restricts delays only after a
person has been "accused" or charged with a crime. 7 The defendants
in Marion had been tried within two months of their indictment, thus
satisfying their right to a speedy trial; the thirty-eight month delay
between their alleged criminal acts and subsequent indictment was
irrelevant to their sixth amendment rights. However, the Marion
Court did not deny that lengthy preindictment delay might have
impact on protected constitutional rights. After noting that statutes of
limitation provided protection against potential prejudice resulting
from delays, the Court suggested in dicta that the due process clause
afforded additional protection to an accused who demonstrated actual
prejudice to his defense:8
[11 t is appropriate to note here that the statute of limitations does not
fully define the appellees' rights with respect to the events occurring
prior to the indictment. Thus, the Government concedes that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would require dismissal of
the indictment if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in
defendant and which therefore invaded the prerogative of the jury-and remanded
the case for a new trial. On retrial before a jury Haga was again convicted of two
counts of first degree murder.
Haga's second conviction also has been appealed; there is a possibility that another
court may reconsider the due process issue discussed in this note and reach a contrary
conclusion. A discussion of whether such a reconsideration would be barred by res
judicata is beyond the scope of this note. Similarly, consideration of whether the six
and one-half year delay between the time of the murders and the second trial of
Haga violates due process is also beyond the scope of this discussion.
5. 404 U.S. 307(1971).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 313.
8. Id. at 324-25 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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this case caused substantial prejudice to appellees' rights to a fair trial
and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage
over the accused . . . .However, we need not, and could not now,
determine when and in what circumstances actual prejudice resulting
from pre-accusation delays requires the dismissal of the prosecution..
. [T] o accommodate the sound administration of justice to the rights
of a defendant to a fair trial will necessarily involve a delicate
judgment based on the circumstances of each case.
While Marion suggests that establishing a due process violation for
preaccusation delay is more difficult than showing a sixth amendment
violation for delay of trial following indictment, the two tasks are
closely related and courts weigh many of the same factors in handling
both. For example, in Barker v. Wingo,9 a sixth amendment decision,
the Court enumerated four factors which must be weighed in deciding
whether a defendant has been deprived of a speedy trial: length of
delay, justification for the delay, the defendant's diligence in asserting
his rights, and the degree of prejudice occasioned by the delay. In pre-
accusation delay cases, courts consider the same factors; the
difference lies in the relative weights and presumptions assigned to
them. In Barker, the Court weighed the length of the delay and the
government's reason for it against the prejudice to the defendant, 10
and, concluding that the defendant had not wanted a speedy trial,"
found no violation of the sixth amendment. 12 In reaching this
decision, however, the Court labeled the question a close one and
stated, "It is clear that the length of delay between arrest and trial-
well over five years-was extraordinary."'13
Perhaps a delay of five years between the commission of a crime
and the arrest of a suspect is not "extraordinary." But a five year delay
before arrest when all the evidence is available immediately after the
crime is committed seems highly unusual, particularly when the only
reason given for the delay is the difference in judgment between two
prosecutors. 14 Relying on the Marion dictum and analogizing from
the Barker holding, both the length of and the reason for the delay
9. 407 U.S. 514 (1972)
10. Id. at 530.
11. Id. at 534.
12. Id. at 536
13. Id. at 533.
14. See note 21 infra.
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seem appropriate factors to consider in making the "delicate judgment
based on the circumstances of each case." 15
II. PREACCUSATION DELAY AS A VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS: THE HAGA TEST
The two essential elements of due process of law are notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Implicit in this concept of due process is the
right of a defendant in a criminal prosecution to be afforded an ade-
quate period to prepare and present such defenses as he may have.
Preaccusation delay may interfere with this ability to defend and
therefore may violate due process. As the California Court of Appeal
has noted: 16
[A] n accused may under some circumstances be deprived of due
process of law if the lapse of time between the commission of the of-
fense and the filing of the accusation makes it difficult or impossible
for him to adequately prepare his defense ....
The due process test that the Haga court determined appropriate in
preaccusation delay cases (and purported to apply) requires dismissal
of the charge "when actual prejudice is shown, and the prosecutor had
no reasonable justification for the delay."' 7 This test is consistent with
Marion's suggestion that courts look beyond the statute of limitations
in determining whether the defendant's due process rights have been
violated by preaccusation delay. 18
Application of the Haga test is therefore a two step process. A court
cannot find that a defendant's due process rights have been violated
until it finds that the delay has caused "actual prejudice." 19 Once the
15. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
16. People v. Alvarado, 258 Cal. App. 2d 756, 66 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43 (1968).
17. 8 Wn. App. at 484-85, 507 P.2d at 162.
18. 404 U.S. at 324, quoted in Haga, 8 Wn. App. at 484, 507 P.2d at 162.
19. 8 Wn. App. at 484, 507 P.2d at 162-63. There is an exception to this rule.
See United States v. Giacalone, 477 F.2d 1273, 1276 (6th Cir. 1973). Also, in a
subsequent case. Division III of the Court of Appeal noted in dictum that "[t] he
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does include preindictment delay
which causes substantial prejudice. ... State v. Messinger, 8 Wn. App. 829, 839,
509 P.2d 382, 389 (1973) (emphasis added). The use of the term "substantial pre-
judice" could be interpreted as a shorthand way of saying that the prejudice must
outweigh the justification for the delay if dismissal is to be ordered. The Messinger
court did not find substantial prejudice in a five month prearrest delay. See notes 26 and
32 infra.
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delay has been shown to have resulted in "actual prejudice" to the
accused's ability to defend, " [t] he justification for the delay must be
balanced against the prejudice to the defendant's ability to offer such
evidence as there is in his defense. '20 This formulation indicates that
whether a denial of due process is found depends upon whether the
justification for the delay outweighs the prejudice to the defendant.
Unfortunately, the Haga courts "application" of its test is question-
able at best. The court did not claim to find any justification for the
delay;21 instead it relied on the "legislative intent" expressed by the
absence of a statute of limitations for murder as a justification. 22 Yet
the content of this "legislative intent" was never discussed or defined.
This cloudy analysis is clearly at odds with the reasoning used by
courts in other jurisdictions in applying similar tests in preaccusation
delay decisions.
Such a balancing test was first applied in 1965 in Ross v. United
States,23 where the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a
seven month delay between an alleged narcotics sale to an undercover
agent and the seller's subsequent arrest was without justification and
was so likely to have prejudiced the defendant that he had been
denied a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. The court recognized a "substantial public interest" in
effective police work and the need for undercover agents in narcotics
law enforcement,2 4 but concluded that the continuing secrecy con-
cerning the undercover investigation had become so unnecessary that
it "fail [ed] to balance the scale against appellant's accelerating need
to know that .... he was ultimately going to be charged with having
committed a crime .... ,125 The court concluded that, because the
20. 8 Wn. App. at 487, 507 P.2d at 164.
21. Id. at 486, 507 P.2d at 163:
The sole reason for the delay was the apparent difference of opinion between
the prosecuting attorney in office at the time of the crime and his successor...
as to whether there was sufficient evidence on which to prosecute.
TIIE COURT: What was there available to a prosecutor in 1971 that was not
available to a prosecutor in 1965?
PROSECUTOR: I would have to say that either the evidence was the same or
that the people who reviewed the case in 1966 weren't as thorough as the people
who reviewed the case in 1971.
22. Id. at 489, 507 P.2d at 165.
23. 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
24. Id. at 212.
25. Id. at 213.
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length of the delay was unjustified and the appellant had a "plausible
claim" of prejudice to his defense, reversal was necessary. 26 This rea-
soning has also been adopted by the California Supreme Court in
Jones v. Superior Court,27 where the court found that police delay in
arresting a defendant for sale of heroin was "clearly unreasonable"
because "it advanced no proper police purpose. The 'buy program'
was completed and formal charges had been filed. No additional wit-
nesses were being sought, and petitioner could have readily been
promptly located and arrested. '28
The fact that preaccusation delay serves a legitimate law enforce-
ment purpose does not per se foreclose a defendant's due process
claim. As the California Court of Appeal noted in People v. Wright,
the fact that the public interest is served 29
does not mean, however, that the public interest must always prevail.
The accused has substantial rights which must be protected, and the
delay between the alleged offense and the time of arrest must not re-
sult in a deprivation of due process .... [T] he question in this type of
case must be resolved by balancing interests ....
In other words, to be justified, a preaccusation delay must serve a le-
gitimate public interest which outweighs the defendant's right to be
given notice of the charges to be brought against him.
Decisions following Ross have elaborated further on the application
of the due process test in preaccusation delay cases. Courts agree that
an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether a delay was
reasonable when balanced against the resulting prejudice, 30 and that
the defendant bears the burden of persuasion with respect to both
26. Id. at 215. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), could modify Ross
insofar as the Ross court required only a plausible claim of prejudice, for the Marion
Court noted that statutes of limitation guard against possible prejudice to the
defendant, whereas actual prejudice must be shown to establish a due process claim,
404 U.S. at 323-24. However, Marion did not rule out the possibility that prejudice
could be presumed from circumstances surrounding the delay, such as the passage of
time alone; cf. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
cited in Haga, 8 Wn. App. at 486, 509 P.2d at 163.
27. 3 Cal. 3d 734, 478 P.2d 10, 91 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1970).
28. 3 Cal. 3d 734, 478 P.2d at 14, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
29. 2 Cal. App. 3d 732, 82 Cal. Rptr. 859, 861 (1966). Accord, Godfrey v.
United States, 358 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
30. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 326; People v. Sobiek, 30 Cal. App.
3d 458, 471, 106 Cal. Rptr. 519, 527 (1973) (in the speedy trial context, no inquiry
should be made into the reasonableness of the delay until prejudice has been shown).
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parts of the test;31 they differ on what suffices to establish prejudice. 32
Most agree in principle that there must be a showing of "actual" or
"substantial" prejudice, 33 and that the defendant's mere assertion that
the passage of time has placed a burden on his ability to remember
and locate witnesses will not suffice.34 Where the alleged prejudice
involves the disappearance of witnesses it has beef held that some
offer must be made concerning the substance, as well as the unavaila-
bility, of the missing testimony. 35 The defendant might demonstrate,
for example, that the witnesses are unavailable, that their testimony is
material and relevant to the case, and that the defendant has exercised
due diligence in his attempt to find them.36
After actual prejudice to the defendant has been established, courts
must determine whether it can be outweighed by any of the various
justifications the state may assert. Police undercover work in enforce-
ment of drug laws is one of the most commonly recognized justifica-
tions for preaccusation delay.37 Others include heavy caseloads, 38
31. United States v. Wilson, 346 F. Supp. 371, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1972); People v.
Sobiek, 30 Cal. App. 3d 458, 471, 106 Cal. Rptr. 519, 527 (1973).
32. In a subsequent case, the Washington Court of Appeals dismissed a similar
due process claim based on preaccusation delay by noting that "there has been no
showing of any unusual circumstances indicating defendant was prejudiced by the
failure to formally charge him until [5 months after the crime] "' State v. Messinger,
8 Wn. App. 829, 839, 509 P.2d 382, 389 (1973). The "unusual circumstances" language
probably means there was no showing of actual prejudice beyond what would be
inferred from the mere passage of five months' time.
33. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 326 (1971); United States v. Dukow,
453 F.2d 1328, 1330 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Wilson, 357 F. Supp. 619,
620-21 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Wilson, 346 F. Supp. 371, 374-76 (E.D.
Pa. 1972); State v. Messinger, 8 Wn. App. 829, 839, 509 P.2d 382, 389 (1973).
There may be two exceptions to the absolute rule of a necessity of showing actual
prejudice. First, if it can be shown that the delay was for the purpose of harassment
or to enable the Government to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant, a
showing of actual prejudice may not be necessary. See Marion, at 324-25. See also
United States v. Churchill, 483 F.2d 268, 275 (1st Cir. 1973) (Coffin, CJ., concurring).
Second, in the case of a lengthy delay (8 years) between "arrest" and trial of a
prisoner who was incarcerated and who repeatedly demanded a trial, no actual
prejudice need be found. Hoskins v. Wainwright, 485 F.2d 1186, 1192, 1194 (5th
Cir. 1973). The Hoskins court relied on Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969), and
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to reach this result.
34. United States v. Erickson, 472 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Alvarado,
258 Cal. App. 2d 756, 66 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43 (1968); State v. Bryson, 53 H. 652, 500
P.2d 1171 (1972); People v. Love, 39 111. 2d 436, 235 N.E.2d 819, 824 (1968).
35. United States v. Dukow, 453 F.2d 1328, 1330 (3d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Wilson, 346 F. Supp. 371, 374-76 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
36. State v. Bryson, 53 H. 652, 500 P.2d 117L (1972); Harris v. State, 489
S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. 1973).
37. See, e.g., People v. Wright, 2 Cal. App. 3d 732, 82 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1969);
People v. Alvarado, 258 Cal. App. 2d 756, 66 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1968).
38. United States v. Marion; 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
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inability to find the defendant,3 9 search for evidence or witnesses40
and lack of police manpower. 41 All have the common characteristic of
necessitating delay in order to promote a legitimate law enforcement
purpose; they thus serve the public interest and can properly be bal-
anced against the defendant's interest in being promptly arrested and
brought to trial.
III. APPLICATION OF THE HAGA TEST
To apply its test, the Haga court first was required to determine
whether the defendant had suffered actual prejudice from the delay-
if not, the inquiry with respect to the defendant's due process claim
would have ended. The defense alleged that because of the delay in
Haga's prosecution, important evidence for both parties had been lost
or weakened by the passage of time. Specifically, the defense con-
tended that Haga was unable to remember many details concerning
the evening of the murders; the first doctor summoned to the scene of
the crime was unable to remember the extent of rigor mortis when he
arrived or whether he checked the fingernails of the bodies for evid-
ence of a struggle; other witnesses had forgotten details important to
Haga's defense; the police had lost some evidence and other evidence
had disappeared. 42 Haga also alleged that his ability to defend on the
grounds of mental irresponsibility had been diminished by the delay.4 3
The fact that the delay occurred before rather than after Haga was
accused may have enhanced its prejudicial effect. In comparing the
effects of pre and postaccusation delay, the Haga court noted that
although the ramifications of preaccusation and postaccusation delay
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1969) (fugitives from justice excluded from the
protection of the statute of limitations).
40. Note, Pre-Arrest Delay: Evolving Due Process Standards, 43 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 722, 741-42 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Pre-Arrest Delay].
41. Id. at 742.
42. 8 Wn. App. at 487-88, 507 P.2d at 164. For a full list of the defendant's
contentions, see id.
The Haga court never explicitly passed on any of the defendant's allegations, except
to admit that the delay was long enough "to cause concern about the dimming of
memories and lost evidence," id. at 488, 507 P.2d at 164.
43. Id. at 487, 507 P.2d at 164. Any defense based on the mental state of the
defendant at the time a crime is committed is especially susceptible to the erosion of
time. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. 11. 1955), where the
court noted in dictum that insanity and other defenses based on the defendant's mental
state at the time a crime was committed are especially vulnerable to the passage of time.
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are different in some respects, damage to the accused's ability to de-
fend is common to both.44 Commentators have recognized this simi-
larity, but also have noted that prejudice is likely to be greater when
caused by preaccusation delay because45
[t] he charged defendant is at least on notice that a criminal prosecu-
tion has been instituted against him and he can marshall evidence and
build a defense ... during the delay period. In contrast, the uncharged
defendant is typically unaware that the police are ready to arrest and
prosecute him at some future time. He is thus foreclosed from taking
any action to forestall the eroding effect that ... delay ... will most
likely have on his ability to prepare and prove a defense.
This observation seems especially pertinent to Haga because, unlike
the situation presented by most cases involving preaccusation delay,
circumstances surrounding the delay of more than five years in the
commencement of Haga's prosecution were likely to lead the de-
fendant to believe that he would never be prosecuted for the murders.
As the California court noted in Jones v. Superior Court, the availa-
bility of the defendant for arrest and the lack of apparent justification
for delay would increase the prejudicial effects of the delay by giving
the defendant a "false sense of security. '46 Similarly, in Haga, the
most likely suspect was available for prosecution, no police under-
cover work was involved, and no new evidence was found after the
initial investigation had been completed. The decision to prosecute
Haga more than five years after the commission of the murders was
not prompted by any of the usual justifications for such delays, but
was apparently attributed to no more than a different opinion by a
44. 8 Wn. App. at 485-86, 507 P.2d at 163. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),
quoted in Haga, 8 Wn. App. at 485, 507 P.2d at 163, listed three possible consequences
of postaccusation delay: (1) Pretrial incarceration, (2) anxiety and concern of the
accused and (3) impairment of the accused's ability to defend. Although the Haga
court recognized only impairment of the accused's ability to defend as a consequence
of preaccusation delay, Justice Douglas noted in his concurring opinion in Marion
that anxiety of the accused is common to both pre and postaccusation delay:
Undue delay may be as offensive to the right to a speedy trial before as after
indictment or information. The anxiety and concern attendant on public accusation
may weigh more heavily upon an individual who has not yet been formally
indicted or arrested for, to him, exoneration by a jury of his peers may be only
a vague possibility lurking in the distant future.
404 U.S. at 330-31 (Douglas, J., concurring).
45. Pre-Arrest Delay, supra note 40, at 725.
46. 3 Cal. 3d 734, 741,478 P.2d 10, 14, 91 Cal. Rptr. 578, 582(1970).
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new prosecuting attorney concerning the merits of the case.47 The log-
ical inference for Haga to have drawn from the decision not to prose-
cute immediately was that the case had been permanently dropped. 48
This inference would be less reasonable in cases where the delay
served some law enforcement purpose leading toward prosecution as,
for example, where the delay is caused by police undercover work,
inability to find the defendant, or the search for evidence or witnesses.49
Police investigatory work or a potential defendant's proximity to
criminal conduct is likely to put him on notice that his arrest remains
a possibility;50 certainly, the conduct of the prosecutor and police will
not actually lead him to feel free from prosecution. With notice of
possible prosectuion, the potential defendant can protect himself by
preserving evidence in his favor and prejudice will not result.
Despite the evidence of prejudice to Haga's defense, the decision is
ambiguous as to whether the court made the finding of "actual preju-
dice" required for dismissal. At one point the court stated "the
showing is short of actual prejudice,"51 but stated inconsistently a few
sentences later: "The showing of actual prejudice is insufficient... "
to overcome the legislative intent expressed by the absence of a statute
of limitations on prosecutions for murder.52 Depending upon which
statement the analyst relies, either no prejudice was found and dis-
missal was therefore not required, or the court found actual prejudice
but applied a test different from the one it defined earlier in its
opinion. These possibilities will be examined in turn.
Relative to the showings of prejudice required by other courts,53 as
evidenced in the cases cited by the Haga court itself,54 the defense
seems to have amply demonstrated the "actual prejudice" required by
the due process test. As another division of the Washington Court of
47. 8 Wn. App. at 486-87, 507 P.2d at 163.
48. It is clear that a suspect in a criminal investigation has no right to a "speedy"
arrest, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966), cited in Haga, 8 Wn. App.
at 485, 507 P.2d at 163; but it is equally well established that "[s] tale claims have
never been favored by the law, and far less so in criminal cases." Dickey v. Florida.
398 U.S. 30, 38 (1970).
49. Pre-Arrest Delay, supra note 40, at 725.
50. United States v. Erickson, 472 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1973).
51. 8 Wn. App. at 489, 507 P.2d at 165.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. See notes 30-36 and accompanying text supra.
54. United States v. lannelli, 461 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Capaldo,
402 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); State v. Christensen, 75 Wn. 2d 678, 453 P.2d 644
(1969); State v. Rolax, 3 Wn. App. 653, 479 P.2d 158 (1970), cited in Haga, 8 Wn.
App. at 489, 507 P.2d at 165.
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Appeals noted in State v. Rolax: "Common examples of prejudice to a
defendant are where witnesses have become unavailable or relevant
evidence has been destroyed or lost because of the delay."5 5 In con-
cluding that "[o] nly where actual prejudice is shown is reversal justi-
fied,"' 56 the Haga court cited cases which merely rejected claims of
prejudice asserted without specific foundation, such as the defendant's
vague claim that he "might have found witnesses" but for the delay. 57
Furthermore, in each of the two cases cited in which actual prejudice
was merely alleged, the court seemed as impressed by the govern-
ment's showing of justification as by the lack of showing of actual
prejudice.58 In Haga, the prosecution did not contest the defense's spe-
cific allegations of missing witnesses or physical evidence lost by the
police nor did it assert any justification for the delay.59 The court should
have found these apparently undisputed allegations sufficient to fulfill
the "actual prejudice" requirement of the due process test.
IV. LACK OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS A
JUSTIFICATION FOR PREACCUSATION DELAY
Alternatively, the court's statement that "the showing of actual prej-
udice must be sufficient to overcome the legislative intent expressed by
the absence of a limitation on prosecution for such a crime, before the
prosecution should be forbidden" 60 could be interpreted as defining a
different due process test for preaccusation delay cases involving
crimes without statutes of limitation. Under such a test the legislative
decision that there should be no statute of limitations on murder pros-
ecutions defines a public policy which serves as at least a partial sub-
stitute for justification of the delay. The court's holding that " [t] he
showing of actual prejudice is insufficient to amount to a denial of due
process when subjected to that criterion"61 would mean, under this
55. 3 Wn. App. 653, 658, 479 P.2d 158, 160 (1970), cited in Haga, 8 Wn. App.
at 489, 507 P.2d at 165.
56. 8 Wn. App. at 489, 507 P.2d at 165.
57. United States v. lanneli, 461 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1972).
58. Id. at 483; United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
59. Although the prosecution disputed the prejudicial effect of the riissing evidence,
the fact that certain evidence had been lost was conceded by the prosecution, see
Brief for Respondent, at 12-15, and the Haga court seemed to conclude that the
evidence had in fact been lost, 8 Wn. App. at 487-88, 507 P.2d at 164.
60. 8 Wn. App. at 489, 507 P.2d at 165.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
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interpretation, that Haga demonstrated some actual prejudice, but
that his showing of prejudice was outweighed when balanced against
this legislative policy.
This approach would be inconsistent with the court's definition of
the due process test discussed earlier, and with the Supreme Court's
dictum in Marion, however. The cases cited by the court as authority
for this test uniformly required prosecutorial justification; none of
them took account of the relevant statute of limitations. 62 Further-
more, use of such a test would ignore Marion's dicta that due process
claims are to be judged by going beyond a consideration of the rele-
vant statute of limitations and applying due process standards. 63
Statutes of limitation are intended to protect defendants from po-
tential prejudice resulting from unreasonable delay. They provide this
protection by creating an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice after
the passage of a specified length of time.64 The absence of a statute of
limitations apparently eliminates this irrebuttable presumption. Legis-
lative removal of a presumption favoring the defendant does not af-
fect the underlying due process rights which the presumption served as
a tool to protect; 65 again, such an elimination should not serve as a
prima facie justification for prosecutorial delay. The Haga court itself
quoted Marion's statement that "the statute of limitations does not
fully define the appellees' rights with respect to the events occurring
prior to indictment."66
Reintroducing the statute of limitations to counterbalance the
showing of prejudice seems to require circular reasoning, since use of
the due process test presupposes an absence of protection from an
applicable statute of limitations. In all preaccusation delay cases
where charges were dismissed on due process grounds the applicable
statute of limitations had not yet run; nevertheless, Marion clearly
suggested that this should not affect the defendant's due process claim. 67
Nor should the total absence of a statute of limitations (in essence a
62. United States v. Hauff, 461 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
lannelli, 461 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Mones, 336 F. Supp. 1322
(S.D. Fla. 1972), cited in Haga, 8 Wn. App. at 485, 507 P.2d at 163.
63. 404 U.S. at 324.
64. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966), quoted in United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. at 322.
65. 404 U.S. at 323.
66. Id. at 324, quoted in Haga, 8 Wn. App. at 484, 507 P.2d at 162 (emphasis in
original).
67. Id.
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statute which never runs) affect such a claim. Since the due process
test is used only as a last resort when the state has failed to protect
fully the constitutional right to due process by providing a statute of
limitations adequate to prevent actual prejudice, the state can hardly
argue this failure as an ingredient of the test designed to compensate
for it. To do so would be to replace the courts with the legislature as
the final arbiter of the constitutional guarantee to due process of law.68
V. CONCLUSION
By extending in dictum the protection of the due process clause to
delays occuring prior to arrest or indictment, the Marion Court
adopted a middle position between the extremes of extending the
guarantee of a speedy trial to preaccusation delay and relying solely
on statutes of limitation to protect defendants from the effects of such
delays. It is therefore clear from Marion that due process claims are
not to be judged on the basis of the relevant statute of limitations, or
absence thereof, in preaccusation delay cases.
The Haga court described the proper test for judging the defend-
ant's due process claim, but misapplied it. Precedents cited by the
court itself indicate that Haga probably made a sufficient showing of
actual prejudice. Therefore, Haga's showing of prejudice should have
been weighed against whatever justification the prosecution had to
offer for the five year delay in Haga's prosecution. Since no justifica-
tion was offered or found, the court should have ordered the charges
against Haga dismissed. Instead, under the guise of applying a due
process test, the court seized upon the absence of a limitation on
murder prosecutions to foreclose the judicial inquiry into due process
claims suggested by Marion. At a later date the court of appeals may
have an opportunity to bring Washington law more directly into line
with due process standards set by the United States Supreme Court.
Richard A. Hansen*
68. Jones v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 734, 478 P.2d 10, 13, 91 Cal. Rptr. 578,
581 (1971).
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